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Finally, the Cohen court's restrictive interpretation of section
50-e seems to deprive the 1976 amendment of its vitality by giving
it de minimus effect. Where an infant brings an action against a
municipal corporation, the amendment, as interpreted in Cohen,
merely substitutes 1 year and 90 days for the prior 1-year period as
the time limitation within which an infant may apply for permission
to serve a late notice of claim. This result hardly supplied the
"urgently require [d] statutory relief' to which the Judicial Conference referred in its 1976 report to the legislature. 3 ' Further, in actions against public corporations where the applicable statute of
limitations is 1 year,231 the Cohen interpretation has the effect of
negating the amendment and reinstating the prior law, since under
either version of section 50-e the time limitation to apply for leave
to serve a late notice would be 1 year from the date the cause of
action accrues. Because such results were not intended by the legislative changes, other courts should not follow this rigid position.
Clara S. Licata

GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW

GOL § 17-103(1): Contractualprovision agreed upon before cause
of action accrued may not extend statute of limitations notwithstanding contrary intent of parties
Statutes of limitations are intended to protect individuals from
"stale" and "vexatious" claims and the public by "giving repose to
human affairs." Although
contracting parties have some freedom
0
1976 REPORT, supra note 207, at 286.
public corporation includes a municipal corporation, a district corporation or a
public benefit corporation. N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 66(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979). The
1-year 90-day statute of limitations prescribed by § 50-i of the General Municipal Law applies
only to municipal corporations. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-i (McKinney 1977). There are numerous
public benefit corporations within the Public Authorities Law which prescribe a 1-year statute of limitations for tort claims. E.g., N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW §§ 569-a(2), 1276(2), 1297(2),
1299-p(2) (McKinney 1970).
1 Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 429, 248 N.E.2d 871, 872, 301
N.Y.S.2d 23, 25 (1969); see Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938).
Although considered statutes of repose, Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270
N.Y. 287, 302, 200 N.E. 824, 827 (1936), statutes of limitations often may prevent the assertion of a just claim. Any resulting hardship, however, is deemed outweighed by the public
interest in barring stale claims. Id. at 302, 200 N.E. at 827-28; Note, Validity and Effect of
Agreements Waiving the Statute of Limitations, 1951 Wis. L. REv. 718, 718. Moreover, courts
may not ignore these statutes in order to prevent an unjust result. In re City of New York
(Elm St.), 239 N.Y. 220, 225; 146 N.E. 342, 344 (1924); see CPLR 201 (1972). See generally 1
WK&M
201.01.
211
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to alter this period by shortening the applicable time,24 agreements
extending the statutory limitation will be upheld in contract disputes only when executed after the cause of action has accrued.25
In John J. Kassner & Co. v. City of New York,2 6 the Court of
Appeals recently held that a contractual clause could not extend the
statute of limitations despite its intended function to shorten the
statutory period, because it was adopted before the cause of action
on the contract had accrued. 7
In Kassner, the plaintiff, a professional engineering corporation, and the City of New York entered into a construction contract
providing for payment in installments as the work progressed, subject to audit by the city comptroller. 8 According to the terms of the
See CPLR 201 (1972). CPLR 201 provides:
An action, including one brought in the name or for the benefit of the state,
must be commenced within the time specified in this article unless a different time
is prescribed by law or a shorter time is prescribed by written agreement. No court
shall extend the time limited by law for the commencement of an action.
Agreements that shorten the statutory period are strictly construed. E.g., Stanley R.
Benjamin, Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 72 Misc. 2d 742, 743, 340 N.Y.S.2d 578, 580 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1972); Hauer Constr. Co. v. City of New York, 193 Misc. 747, 749, 85 N.Y.S.2d
42, 44 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1948), aff'd mem, 276 App. Div. 841, 93 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1st
Dep't 1949). Such agreements will be upheld only if the time periods are reasonable. See, e.g.,
Planet Constr. Corp. v. Board of Educ., 7 N.Y.2d 381, 385, 165 N.E.2d 758, 760, 198 N.Y.S.2d
68, 72 (1960); Sapinkopf v. Cunard S.S. Co., 254 N.Y. 111, 113-14, 172 N.E. 259, 259 (1930)
(per curiam); Staff v. Lido Dunes, Inc., 47 Misc.2d 322, 327, 262 N.Y.S.2d 544, 549 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1965). See generally 2 CARMODY-WAr 2d, N.Y. PRAc.,
13:6 (1965 & Supp.
1979); 35 N.Y. JUR., Limitations and Laches, § 5 (1964 & Supp. 1979); 8 WK&M T 7502.15.
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 17-103[1] (McKinney 1978). Section 17-103[1] which prescribes the exclusive method of extending or waiving the statute of limitations, provides in
pertinent part:
A promise to waive, to extend, or not to plead the statute 8f limitation applicable to an action arising out of a contract. . ., if made after the accrual of the cause
of action and made . . . in a writing signed by the promisor. . . is effective...
in an action or proceeding commenced within the time that would be applicable if
the cause of action had arisen at the date of the promise, or within such shorter
time as may be provided in the promise.
Id. Advance waivers of any statutory benefits founded in public policy traditionally have bee.
disfavored by the courts. E.g., Boyd H. Wood Co. v. Horgan, 291 N.Y. 422, 426, 52 N.E.2d
932, 933-34 (1943); Crowe v. Liquid Carbonic Co., 208 N.Y. 396, 402-03, 102 N.E. 573, 575
(1913); Shapley v. Abbott, 42 N.Y. 443, 452 (1870); Pine v. Okoniewski, 256 App. Div. 519,
520, 11 N.Y.S.2d 13, 15 (4th Dep't 1939). Since statutes of limitations are legislative expressions of public policy, see note 233 and accompanying text supra, courts similarly have
disapproved of waivers made before the cause of action accrues, see Watertown Nat'l Bank
v. Bagley, 134 App. Div. 831, 834, 119 N.Y.S. 592, 596 (4th Dep't 1909); Gorowitz v. Blumstein, 184 Misc. 111, 116, 53 N.Y.S.2d 179, 184 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1944). See generally 1
WK&M
201.12.
-8 46 N.Y.2d 544, 389 N.E.2d 99, 415 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1979), rev'g 62 App. Div. 2d 1184,
404 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1978) (mem).
23 46 N.Y.2d at 552, 389 N.E.2d at 104, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
Id. at 548, 389 N.E.2d at 101, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
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contract, any action arising under its provisions had to be commenced within 6 months of the filing of a certificate of final payment with the city comptroller.29 After completing its work, the
plaintiff submitted a claim for final payment, most of which was
disallowed by the comptroller. 20 Although the disallowance was
promptly protested, more than 6 years had passed before the plaintiff demanded final compensation. 2 1 Upon receiving a request for
payment of the amount approved by the comptroller, the city paid
the plaintiff, and a certificate of final payment was filed in the
comptroller's office. 242 Less -than 6 months later, the plaintiff
brought suit to recover the unpaid balance.2 The city moved for
summary judgment, claiming the 6-year statute of limitations
barred the action. 24 Concluding that the parties were bound by the
21

Id. The contract provided:

No action shall be . . . maintained against the City upon any claim based upon
this contract or arising out of this contract . . . unless such action shall be commenced within six (6) months after the date of filing in the office of the Comptroller
of the City of the certificate for. . . final payment . . . . None of the provisions of
Article 2 of the [CPLR] shall apply to any action against the City arising out of
this contract.
Id. The clause is apparently a standard provision in city contracts; its purpose is to prevent
stale or fraudulent claims from being asserted against the city. See, e.g., Soviero Bros. Contracting Corp. v. City of New York, 286 App. Div. 435, 439, 142 N.Y.S.2d 508, 511 (1st Dep't
1955), aff'd mem., 2 N.Y.2d 924, 141 N.E.2d 918, 161 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1957).
2"1 46 N.Y.2d at 548, 389 N.E.2d at 101, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 787. On December 13, 1967, the
plaintiff requested payment of $39,523.69. The comptroller disallowed $38,423.69, authorizing
payment of only $1,100. Id.
"I Id. Neither the exact date of the final audit nor the date when the plaintiff first
became aware of its results is clear. See id. The evidence indicated, however, that the plaintiff
learned of the audit's outcome by July 1, 1968, the date it sent the city a letter of protest
demanding payment of the full amount claimed. Id.
242Id. The check for $1,100 was sent to the plaintiff and the certificate was filed with
the comptroller's office on November 8, 1974. Id.
13 Id. The action was commenced on April 18, 1975. Id.
214Id.; see CPLR 213(2) (1972). The city contended that, since "the plaintiff's cause of
action [had] 'accrued no later than July 1, 1968,'" the date on which it was shown that the
plaintiff knew it had a claim against the city, see note 241 supra, the action was time-barred
because it was commenced more than 6 years after it had accrued. 46 N.Y.2d at 548-49, 389
N.E.2d at 101-02, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 788. As a second defense, the city claimed the contractual
limitations clause was intended to curtail the statute of limitations and therefore could not
serve to extend it. Id. at 549, 389 N.E.2d at 102, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 788. In addition, the city
argued that, since it had no power to waive the statute of limitations, see N.Y. GEN. CrTY
LAw § 20[5] (McKinney 1968), the limitation provision in the contract was void. 46 N.Y.2d
at 549, 389 N.E.2d at 102, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
The plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that the 6-month period established by the
contract governed the action and began to run when the final payment certificate had been
filed in the comptroller's office. The plaintiff also urged that the city had not waived the
statute of limitations in the. contract, but merely had specified the event that would cause
the statute of limitations to begin to run. Id.
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limitations period prescribed in the contract, the Supreme Court,
New York County, held that the action was timely since it was
commended within 6 months of the filing of the certificate of final
payment.2 5 The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed.24
On appeal, a unanimous Court of Appeals reversed.2 17 Writing
for the Court, Judge Wachtler2 1 reasoned that since the cause of
action accrued upon the completion of the comptroller's final audit,
when the plaintiff had the right to demand payment of the undisputed balance, the suit was not commenced within the period established by the statute of limitations. 249 Addressing the contractual
limitations period, the Court held that the parties could not extend
the statute of limitations.25 Judge Wachtler noted that although
agreements reducing the time within which an action must be
commenced will be upheld if reasonable,25' attempts to lengthen the
limitations period are more restricted.2 2 The Court observed that
21546 N.Y.2d at 549, 389 N.E.2d at 102, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 788. The supreme court stated:
"The City entered into a binding agreement and it may not now use the CPLR as a shield
against the provisions of the contract." Id.
211 62 App. Div. 2d 1184, 404 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1978) (mem).
24746 N.Y.2d at 552, 389 N.E.2d at 104, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
219Judge Wachtler was joined by Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones
and Fuchsberg.
21146 N.Y.2d at 550, 389 N.E.2d at 102-03, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 788-89; see CPLR 213(2)
(1972). Noting that a contract cause of action accrues at the time of breach, the Court
observed that when performance is subject to a condition, a cause of action generally accrues
only upon fulfillment of the condition. 46 N.Y.2d at 550, 389 N.E.2d at 102, 415 N.Y.S.2d at
788 (citing Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N.Y. 649 (1882); SIMPSON, CONTRACTS § 112 (1973); 36 N.Y.
JUR., Limitations and Laches § 61 (1964)). The Court concluded, therefore, that the city's
obligation to pay was conditioned upon the comptroller's audit and not upon the filing of the
certificate of final payment, 46 N.Y.2d at 550, 389 N.E.2d at 102, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 788-89,
because the comptroller "unequivocally refused to pay the full amount demanded and allegedly due on the contract" when the audit was completed. Id., 389 N.E.2d at 103, 415 N.Y.S.2d
at 789.
Although the Kassner Court also stated that the plaintiff's cause of action accrued when
the "audit was completed and the plaintiff was informed of the results," id., 389 N.E.2d at
102, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 789, it should be noted that the plaintiff's knowledge of the outcome of
the audit was not a prerequisite to the accrual of the action. See, e.g., Bykowsky v. Public
Nat'l Bank, 209 App. Div. 61, 204 N.Y.S. 385 (1st Dep't 1924), aff'd mem., 240 N.Y. 555,
148 N.E. 702 (1925); Cincus v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 149 N.Y.S.2d 602
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1956).
21o 46 N.Y.2d at 550, 389 N.E.2d at 103, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
21 Id. at 550-51, 389 N.E.2d at 103, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 789; see Sapinkopf v. Cunard S.S.
Co., 254 N.Y. 111, 113-14, 172 N.E. 259, 259 (1930) (per curiam); CPLR 201 (1972); note 234
supra.
252 46 N.Y.2d at 551, 389 N.E.2d at 103, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 789. The Court considered both
the private and public interests that are implicated in statutes of limitations. Id. at 550, 389
N.E.2d at 103, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 789 (quoting Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d
427, 429, 248 N.E.2d 871, 872, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25 (1969)); see Schwartz v. Hayden Newport
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agreements to extend the statute of limitations must comply with
section 17-103[1] of the General Obligations Law, 53 which requires
254
the agreement to be adopted after the cause of action has accrued.
Since the contractual limitations clause in Kassner had been agreed
upon before the plaintiff's cause of action had accrued, the Court
held that it was unenforceable, notwithstanding that the parties'
original intent "undoubtedly was to curtail the statutory period." ' 5
It is submitted that the Kassner decision is consistent with the
public policy of the General Obligations Law.2ss The purpose of
section 17-103[1], applicable to contract causes of action, 2 7 is to

prevent a party in a superior bargaining position from coercing a
Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963); note 233 supra.While
agreements shortening the statute of limitations implement the public policy of the statute,
see note 1 and accompanying text supra, and are enforceable if reasonable, see Sapinkopf v.
Cunard S.S. Co., 254 N.Y. 111, 172 N.E. 259 (1930) (per curiam); Ripley v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
30 N.Y. 136, 163 (1864), the Kassner Court observed that agreements waiving or extending
the statute are ineffective if made before any liability has arisen "because a party cannot 'in
advance, make a valid promise that a statute founded in public policy shall be inoperative."'
46 N.Y.2d at 551, 389 N.E.2d at 103, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 789 (quoting Shapley v. Abbott, 42 N.Y.
443, 452 (1870)); see Pine v. Okoniewski, 256 App. Div. 519, 11 N.Y.S.2d 13 (4th Dep't 1939);
Crocker v. Ireland, 235 App. Div. 760, 256 N.Y.S. 638 (4th Dep't 1932); note 235 supra. When
agreements to waive or extend the statute of limitations are included as part of the original
contract, it was found that there is a greater risk that they might be the product of
"ignorance" or "unequal bargaining position." 46 N.Y.2d at 551, 389 N.E.2d at 103, 415
N.Y.S.2d at 789.
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 17-103[1] (McKinney 1978).
"1 46 N.Y.2d at 551-52, 389 N.E.2d at 103, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 789-90; see note 235 supra.
2 46 N.Y.2d at 552, 389 N.E.2d at 104, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 790. The Court observed that
the contractual provision was "a standard clause which, undoubtedly, was included to
shorten the Statute of Limitations." Id. (citing Soviero Bros. Contracting Corp. v. City of
New York, 286 App. Div. 435, 142 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1st Dep't 1955), aff'd mem., 2 N.Y.2d 924,
141 N.E.2d 918, 161 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1957)); see note 239 supra.
Addressing the city's argument that the agreement was unenforceable because the city
has no authority to waive the statute of limitations, see N.Y. GEN. CrrY LAW § 20[5] (McKinney 1968); note 244 supra, the Court reasoned that, while the city has no power to waive the
statute, it may, under limited circumstances, extend the statutory period. 46 N.Y.2d at 552,
389 N.E.2d at 104, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 790; see NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 5, § 93d-3.1
(1976). The Court noted that the statute may be extended only after the limitation period
has expired, and since the agreement in Kassner was made before the statute had run, the
Court concluded that the limitation clause in the contract did not constitute an extension of
the statute of limitations. 46 N.Y.2d at 551-52, 389 N.E.2d at 103-04, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 78990.
9 See note 235 supra.
21 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 17-103[1] (McKinney 1978). One authority has suggested
that in a non-contract case, an agreement extending the statute of limitations might be
utilized to estop the defendant from raising the statute of limitations as a defense. SIEGEL,
§ 39 (1978); see Robinson v. City of New York, 24 App. Div. 2d 260, 263, 265 N.Y.S.2d 566,
569-70 (1st Dep't 1965).
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waiver of the statute of limitations.25 In order to maintain this
policy the Kassner Court discounted the parties' intent, which
was to shortened the statutory period. Regardless of the form of the
agreement and the apparent intent of the parties when they enter a
contract, Kassner requires striking a provision that has the effect of
lengthening the statute of limitations.2 9
Under circumstances different from Kassner, it nevertheless
would appear that contracting parties sometimes may delay the
time at which the cause of action normally accrues by including in
the initial agreement a condition precedent to the fulfillment of the
contractual obligations. Where the right to final payment is contingent upon the happening of a specified event, a cause of action for
money due on the contract does not accrue, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run, until that event has occurred. 211 Provided the condition precedent was an integral part of the agreement,
such a procedure would not violate section 17-103[1] since it would
not extend the statutory period but merely would delay the commencement of its running.28 1 The plaintiff in Kassner would not be
aided by this procedure, however, since it would not be a substantive provision in the contract.
Thomas A. Leghorn
' See McLaughlin, Statute of Limitation, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 1979, at 1, col. 1. The
General Obligations Law thus would prevent a creditor from requiring a debtor to waive or
extend the statute of limitations as a condition to giving a loan. Id. Once the cause of action
has accrued, however, an agreement waiving or extending the statute of limitations is less
likely to be the result of unequal bargaining power and indeed may be to the advantage of
all parties. Id. See also 46 N.Y.2d at 551, 389 N.E.2d at 103, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
I" The Kassner Court's strict construction of § 17-10311] encompasses not only promises that expressly extend or waive the statute of limitations, but also promises that would
have that result, even though that never was intended by the parties. See 46 N.Y.2d at 552,
389 N.E.2d at 104, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 790. See generally Recommendation of the Law Revision
Commission to the Legislature Relating to Agreements Extending the Statutes of Limitation,
[1961] N.Y. LAW REv. COMM'N REP. 97-99.
260 See, e.g., Blakeley v. Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry Co., 73 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd mem, 272 App. Div. 1001, 74 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1st Dep't 1947).
See also Arc Elec. Constr. Co. v. George A. Fuller Co., 24 N.Y.2d 99, 103, 247 N.E.2d 111,
113, 299 N.Y.S.2d 129, 132 (1969); Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N.Y. 649, 650 (1882).
266 See generally CPLR 206(a) (1972); 1 WK&M 1 206.01.

